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A. Introduction
Our current chief justice, Beverley McLachlin, was appointed to sit on the
bench of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1989. At that time, section 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982, a provision which recognizes and affirms existing
Aboriginal and treaty rights, was fairly freshly minted. Although “born in
the political arena, it was left to the judiciary to flesh out how these rights
would be defined and protected.”1 By 1989, the Court had heard arguments
on section 35(1), but had not yet delivered its first set of reasons interpreting
it.2 The situation was considerably different by the time Beverley McLachlin
was appointed chief justice, in 2000, as during those eleven years the Court
released a number of foundational decisions which interpreted section 35(1)
in terms of Aboriginal rights,3 title rights,4 and treaty rights5. Since 2000,
*
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Associate professor, Dalhousie Faculty of Law. I would like to thank and acknowledge
Michael Asch, John Borrows, Kent McNeil, and Brian Noble for their comments, insights
and helpful conversations on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Hamar
Foster for conversations on aspects of this paper. Errors are, of course, my own. A draft of
this paper was prepared for “The McLachlin Court’s First Decade: Reflections on the Past
and Projections for the Future,” Canadian Bar Association Conference, 19 June 2009.
Gordon Christie, “Judicial Justification of Recent Developments in Aboriginal Law” (2002)
17:2 C.J.L.S. 41 at 41 [Christie, “Judicial Justification”].
The case of R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R 1075, was argued in 1988 [Sparrow].
See ibid.; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet]; and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79 [Gladstone].
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw].
See R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [Marshall (No. 2)];
R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393; and R. v. Sioui, [1990] S.C.J. 48, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
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McLachlin’s Court has rendered decisions addressing a broad scope of matters where section 35(1) has been squarely at issue. These have included
decisions regarding what section 35(1) means for the rights of Metis people6
and for the Crown’s obligations to Aboriginal peoples, whether as a fiduciary or as a matter of Crown honour.7 The Court has also spoken to how
section 35(1) interacts with the division of powers under the Constitution
Act, 1867,8 as well as with how statutory rights or provisions engage with
constitutional and Charter rights.9
The issue upon which this paper focuses is one that runs through much
of the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence over the last ten years: the idea of
“reconciliation.”10 However, the way in which the term is deployed, the values
that inform it, the logic that drives it, and the conclusions that it supports
have shifted and are continuing to shift. There are considerable differences
between how this term was used at the time of Lamer C.J., its meaning for
the bench under McLachlin C.J., and the new role it has evolved to take
on most recently. In particular, reconciliation has come to be understood
as requiring dynamic processes of negotiation, instead of just serving as a
normative justification for infringing Aboriginal rights. This article does not
analyze whether the Court’s understanding of reconciliation resonates with
that of others nor address what others have argued ought to be included in
trying to affect reconciliation.11 Rather, the paper seeks to explore what the
6
7
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R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, 2003 SCC 43 [Powley], and R. v. Blais 2003 SCC 44.
See Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245 [Wewaykum], and
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388
[Mikisew Cree].
See R. v. Morris 2006 SCC 59 [Morris].
See Ermineskin Indian Band and Nations v. Canada 2009 SCC 9, [2009] S.C.J. 9 [Ermineskin],
and R. v. Kapp 2008 SCC 41, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42 [Kapp].
See Dwight Newman & Danielle Schweitzer, “Between Reconciliation and the Rule(s) of
Law: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2008) 41 U.B.C.L. Rev. 249 at para. 3.
There is a large and thoughtful body of writing on this matter which offers a variety of
perspectives. See, for example, James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume II:
Democracy and Civic Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 2008) at 223–56 [Tully];
Mark Walters, “Constitutionalism and Political Morality: A Tribute to John D. Whyte,
The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 470, esp. at paras. 54–83 [Walters,
“Constitutionalism”]; Newman & Schweitzer, ibid.; Christie, “Judicial Justification,” above
note 1; John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1997) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537 [Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy”]; and John Borrows “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission” (2001)
46 McGill L.J. 615 at para. 64 [Borrows, “Domesticating”], where Borrows writes: “Courts
have read Aboriginal rights to land and resources as requiring a reconciliation that asks
much more of Aboriginal peoples than it does of Canadians. Reconciliation should not be
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résumé

Z
On réfère constamment à la « doctrine de la réconciliation » lorsqu’il est
question de décisions relatives à des revendications de droits ancestraux
autochtones. Cependant, la manière dont cette doctrine est appliquée
a considérablement évolué, en particulier depuis la nomination de
Beverley McLachlin en qualité de juge en chef. Dans cet article, on fait le
recensement de ces transformations en illustrant la manière dont cette
doctrine est de moins en moins invoquée à titre de justification normative
pour violer les droits ancestraux. À l’heure actuelle, elle joue plutôt le rôle
de processus dynamique pour négocier des relations empreintes de respect,
et a démontré son bien-fondé lorsqu’il s’agit d’étayer ce type de relations en
tant que relations continues. Par conséquent, la doctrine de réconciliation
remaniée modifie la centralité de l’analyse de la violation justifiée à titre de
lieu de la surveillance judiciaire du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la Couronne.
Dans ce chapitre, on analyse en outre les tensions entre la doctrine et le
principe de la primauté du droit, de même que la manière dont la Cour
de madame le juge McLachlin a laissé entendre que la doctrine de la
réconciliation constitue une pratique qui s’infiltre dans une vaste gamme
d’interactions entre la Couronne et les Autochtones, et pas seulement celles
qui sont visées par le paragraphe 35(1).

Court is signalling or intends when it draws upon the language of reconciliation. As such, the article tracks a complex storyline which is marked with
both internal debate and change, as well as with our current chief justice
promoting a fairly consistent trajectory.
The flow of this paper is as follows. The substantive analysis begins
in the second section, which identifies the early deployments of the term
“reconciliation” and in particular draws attention to distinctions between
Lamer C.J.’s understanding and use of “reconciliation,” and those of McLachlin C.J. in the years before she was named chief justice. These distinctions
a front for assimilation.” See also Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) S.C.L.R. (2d) 595 [Slattery, “Generative Structure”]; Dwight Newman,
“Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice” in John Whyte, ed., Moving
Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2008)
at 80–87 [Newman, “Reconciliation”]; and Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and the Supreme
Court: The Opposing Views of Chief Justices Lamer and McLachlin” (2003) 2 Indigenous
L.J. 1–25 [McNeil, “Reconciliation”].
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set a comparative baseline for the rest of the paper. The third section then
turns to the decisions rendered by the Court since Beverley McLachlin was
appointed chief justice. The third section is divided into two subsections.
The first subsection considers whether Lamer C.J.’s approach to reconciliation, as a state of compromise where Aboriginal rights may need to yield to
the common good, has been embraced by the current bench. It also identifies how elements of McLachlin C.J.’s approach to reconciliation during
the 1990s, surface in various forms, either in her reasons or those of other
members of the Court. The second subsection considers how McLachlin’s
Court casts “reconciliation” as a dynamic process, demanding the establishing of relationships that must both be founded in mutual respect and
be renewed if they are to flourish. The fourth section of the paper considers tensions that arise due to reconciliation interests being largely absent
from judicial considerations of non-section 35(1) matters (such as when legal
claims turn on statutory interpretation). The fifth section suggests that McLachlin’s Court has created some room for reconciliation interests to infuse
Aboriginal-Crown law more generally.

B.	Origin stories: Early differences regarding the
meaning of reconciliation and the judicial
role in enabling it
I begin this analysis of “reconciliation” by briefly sketching out its judicial
history. In 1990, Dickson C.J., writing with LaForest J., first drew upon the
term “reconciliation” in the context of section 35(1) in Sparrow. Here the
term was mobilized to explain what section 35(1) called upon the federal
government to do:
[Section 35(1) requires that] federal power be reconciled with federal duty
and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.12

Thus section 35(1) mandated governmental restraint. Previously discretionary exercises of power now had to be reconciled with governmental
duties or obligations.13 When Lamer C.J. addressed section 35(1) some six
12
13

Sparrow, above note 2 at para. 62.
For a careful discussion of the Sparrow decision and its theoretical logic, see Michael
Asch & Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v.
Sparrow” (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 498 [Asch & Macklem]. For a discussion of how the content
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years later in 1996,14 he too identified its purpose as being realized through
reconciliation. His interpretation, although adopted by the majority of the
Court, developed the reconciliation doctrine in a fashion that sparked disagreement. As discussed below, McLachlin J. (as she then was) interpreted
the directions in Sparrow quite differently in terms of what they authorized
and required, and also identified a more clear division between the legitimate scope of judicial versus political decision making.
In an oft-cited passage in R v. Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. wrote the following:
[W]hat s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies,
with their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and
reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown. The substantive rights
which fall within the provision must be defined in light of this purpose;
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed
towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies
with the sovereignty of the Crown.15

This passage affirms that section 35(1) is interpreted to mandate reconciliation, but suggests a changed emphasis on who must undertake accommodations to enable that reconciliation. Chief Justice Lamer further
clarified his interpretation when he wrote that when adjudicating claims,
courts must “be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective, but they must
also be aware that aboriginal rights exist within the general legal system
of Canada.”16 That is, the majority position saw a clear hierarchy. Section
35(1)’s promise of reconciliation was interpreted to take place against the
backdrop of the existing Canadian legal order.
Former Chief Justice Lamer’s position on what reconciliation requires
of Aboriginal people was perhaps most clearly articulated when he delineated interests that the state could legitimately call upon to limit Aboriginal
rights, so as to enable this “reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”17 He addressed this matter

14
15
16
17

of s. 35(1) was originally intended to be determined, see Kent McNeil, “The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recognition of Aboriginal Governments” (1994) 7:1 Western Legal History 113.
Van der Peet and Gladstone, above note 3.
Van der Peet, ibid. at para. 31, Lamer C.J.C.
Ibid. at para. 49, Lamer C.J.C.
Ibid. at para. 31, Lamer C.J.C.
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in one of the companion cases to Van der Peet—R v Gladstone.18 After first
asserting that “limits” on Aboriginal rights in furtherance of objectives “of
sufficient importance to the broader community” are “a necessary part of
reconciliation,”19 the chief justice elaborated as follows:
with regards to the distribution of the fisheries resource after conservation goals have been met, objectives such as the pursuit of economic
and regional fairness, and the recognition of the historical reliance upon,
and participation in, the fishery by non-aboriginal groups, are the type
of objectives which can (at least in the right circumstances) satisfy this
standard [for justified infringement]. In the right circumstances, such objectives are in the interest of all Canadians and, more importantly, the
reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the rest of Canadian society
may well depend on their successful attainment.20

As recently observed by Dwight Newman, “[i]nstead of reconciliation
functioning as a concept that calls for limits on federal power in light of
federal duties, it becomes a concept that limits the scope of section 35.”21
Interpreting section 35(1)’s mandate of reconciliation as requiring Aboriginal people to accept the unilateral diminution of their rights has been subjected to considerable scholarly critique.22 Of relevance for this paper is the
fact that McLachlin J. (as she then was) expressed disagreement with the
approach to section 35(1) which her chief justice had articulated.23 In Van
der Peet, she voiced an interpretation of section 35(1), and an understand-

18
19
20
21
22

23

Gladstone, above note 3. The reasons in Gladstone and Van der Peet were delivered on the
same day, 21 August 1996.
Ibid. at para. 73.
Ibid. at para. 75.
Newman, “Reconciliation,” above note 11 at 82.
The core critique relates to the fact that the non-Aboriginal reliance or interest is in some
instances the direct consequence of Aboriginal rights having historically been denied or
ignored. Conceptual and logical concerns are thus raised by historic denial being used to
justify the lawfulness of contemporary erosion. See, for example, Asch & Macklem, above
note 13; Christie, “Judicial Justification,” above note 1; Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy,”
above note 11; and Borrows, “Domesticating,” above note 11 at para. 64. See also Russell
Barsh & James Sakej Youngblood Henderson, “The Supreme Court Van der Peet Trilogy:
Native Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993, and Kent McNeil, “How
Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?” (1997)
8:2 Const. Forum Const. 33.
For a detailed analysis of the contrasting approaches to reconciliation of former Chief
Justice Lamer and current Chief Justice McLachlin, focusing upon cases prior to 2000,
see McNeil, “Reconciliation,” above note 11.
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ing of what reconciliation means and requires of the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples, which was quite different in several respects.
In particular she found that reconciliation did not require Aboriginal
people to cede their rights without consent. She found that both this demand, and the role Lamer C.J. articulated for courts in approving such decisions in the name of societal reconciliation, were contrary to the goal of
reconciliation. She wrote:
As Sparrow recognized, one of the two fundamental purposes of s. 35(1)
was the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of aboriginal claims.
The Chief Justice . . . correctly notes that such a settlement must be
founded on the reconciliation of aboriginal rights with the larger nonaboriginal culture in which they must . . . find their exercise. The question
is how this reconciliation of the different legal cultures of aboriginal and
non-aboriginal peoples is to be accomplished. More particularly, does the
goal of reconciliation of aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests require that
we permit the Crown to require a judicially authorized transfer of the aboriginal right to non-aboriginals without the consent of the aboriginal people,
without treaty, and without compensation? I cannot think it does.24

Justice McLachlin argued that the only lawful limitations on section
35(1) rights were internal (for example, as defined by the inherent scope or
nature of the right) or external ones that “any property owner or rights user
would reasonably expect . . . if the resource is to be used now and in the
future.”25 She then asked, “[h]ow, without amending the Constitution, can
the Crown cut down the aboriginal right? . . . [Rights] can be diminished
only through treaty and constitutional amendment.” 26 On this interpretation, aside from limitations that went to the one external exception of reasonable use, any unilateral act which diminished section 35(1) rights would
violate the Constitution, and so could not be endorsed by a court.
Not only did McLachlin J. argue that Lamer C.J.’s approach was constitutionally problematic, she was also very clear that the sort of concessions
that Lamer C.J. believed were necessary to effect reconciliation were not
practically necessary:

24
25
26

Van der Peet, above note 3 at para. 310, McLachlin J. in dissent [emphasis added].
Ibid. at para, 306, McLachlin J. in dissent. Then Justice McLachlin also noted that “future
cases may endorse limitation of aboriginal rights on other bases” (at para. 306).
Ibid. at para. 315, McLachlin J. in dissent.
b 207 c

PLMC 09 MacIntosh.indd 207

07/04/2011 3:47:58 PM

constance macintosh

[T]he right imposes its own internal limit . . . The government may impose
additional limits under the rubric of justification to ensure that the right
is exercised responsibly . . . There is no need to impose further limits on it
to effect reconciliation between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples.27

Therefore, prior to being appointed chief justice, McLachlin J. arguably
held a clear theory of how section 35(1) operated to enable reconciliation.
She positioned the judiciary’s key contribution to reconciliation, as mandated by section 35(1), as that of “recognizing the aboriginal legal entitlement.” She wrote:
The second reason why it is unnecessary to adopt the broad doctrine of
justification proposed by the Chief Justice is that other means, yet unexploited, exist for resolving the different legal perspectives of aboriginal
and non-aboriginal people. In my view, a just calibration of the two perspectives starts from the premise that full value must be accorded to such
aboriginal rights as may be established on the facts of the particular case.
Only by fully recognizing the aboriginal legal entitlement can the aboriginal legal perspective be satisfied. At this stage of the process—the stage
of defining aboriginal rights—the courts have an important role to play.

The manner in which these legal rights and two legal perspectives would
then be reconciled with political and social interests was to be through
treaty negotiations. To this end, McLachlin J. wrote:
The process must go on to consider the non-aboriginal perspective—how
the aboriginal right can be legally accommodated within the framework
of non-aboriginal law. Traditionally, this has been done through the treaty
process, based on the concept of the aboriginal people and the Crown negotiating and concluding a just solution to their divergent interests, given
the historical fact that they are irretrievably compelled to live together. At
this stage, the stage of reconciliation, the courts play a less important role. It is
for the aboriginal peoples and the other peoples of Canada to work out a just
accommodation of the recognized aboriginal rights. This process—definition
of the rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) followed by negotiated settlements—is
the means envisioned in Sparrow, as I perceive it, for reconciling the aboriginal and non-aboriginal legal perspectives.28

27
28

Ibid. at para. 312, McLachlin J. in dissent.
Ibid. at para. 313, McLachlin J. in dissent [emphasis added].
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To summarize these key passages, McLachlin J. did not see the role of
the Court as actually affecting or creating a state of reconciliation. Rather,
the Court’s powers under section 35(1) were to recognize the legal entitlements which would inform political negotiations about mutual accommodation, which would in turn support reconciliation through “a just and lasting
settlement.” Effectively, the judiciary would oversee the reconciliation process, while the substance of how interests and rights were reconciled was a
matter of political negotiation and balancing.29 Her perspective at this time
was that the accommodation of non-Aboriginal interests and any recognition
that reconciliation may require eroding Aboriginal rights were to be assessed
in a negotiation process. Aside from the reasonable use restraint described
above, infringements could not be unilaterally imposed by the state.
This theory, so strongly expressed in 1996, was arguably absent by 1997,
when in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia McLachlin J. simply wrote that
she concurred with the chief justice’s set of reasons.30 Chief Justice Lamer
had found in Delgamuukw that the process of reconciliation could justify
state infringement of Aboriginal title for a vast array of activities, including
the “settlement of foreign populations,” the creation of infrastructure, and
the exploitation of various resources,31 a rather overwhelming list that suggested that section 35(1) supported a relationship of power and priorities
only modestly different than completely ignoring Aboriginal rights.32 The
whole bench appeared to have endorsed the same approach. There was
also a unanimous decision from the Court in Marshall (No. 2)33 that further
extended Lamer C.J.’s approach narrowing Aboriginal rights through the
concept of reconciliation. Notably, in all these cases, including both Lamer
C.J. and McLachlin’s reasons in Van der Peet, the Court has been unanimous
in stating that reconciliation will only come about through negotiations.
The core distinction arising from Van der Peet was differing interpretations
of what section 35(1) authorized or required the state to do.

29
30
31
32

33

I specifically thank John Borrows for engaging me in conversations on this point.
Delgamuukw, above note 4 at para. 109.
Ibid. at para. 161.
On this point, see James Tully, “The Struggles of Indigneous Peoples for and of Freedom”
in Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds., Box of Treasures or Empty Box: Twenty Years of Section 35 (Penticton, BC: Theytus Publishing, 2003) 272 at 287. See also Christie, “Judicial
Justification,” above note 1 at 51–52, where he questions “what constitutionalization has
amounted to.”
Marshall (No. 2), above note 5.
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C. The Court under Chief Justice McLachlin and
reconciliation
The first subsection below considers whether former Chief Justice Lamer’s
approach to infringement, as a necessary corollary to reconciliation, has
been endorsed or perpetuated by McLachlin’s Court. It does so by examining cases where Aboriginal rights were proven, therefore there was cause
to consider if an infringing regulation or law was justified. This examination
is effectively inconclusive on this point. The second subsection proposes
that McLachlin’s Court has developed a theory of reconciliation which essentially displaces the practical relevance of Lamer C.J.’s approach.

1) Reconciliation and Infringement
Since Beverley McLachlin was appointed chief justice, there have only been
three cases in which Aboriginal or treaty rights were found to exist—R.
v. Powley,34 R. v. Morris,35 and R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray,36—resulting in situations where the Court turned to a justification analysis. Some members of
the Court also took the opportunity to speak to justification in R. v. Mitchell.37 These cases reveal little about whether the Court under McLachlin C.J.
will continue to adhere to the approach endorsed by Chief Justice Lamer’s
Court of interpreting the reconciliation mandate as sometimes requiring
and authorizing the erosion of Aboriginal rights for the general social good.
As will be discussed in subsection 3b, the answer to this question may have
come to bear rather reduced significance, given other developments in the
reconciliation jurisprudence. Intriguingly, in several instances these decisions resonate in various ways with the interpretation of section 35(1) that
McLachlin C.J. proposed in her dissent in Van der Peet. These cases are
discussed chronologically.
Mitchell involved a claimed right to be exempt from paying taxes when
crossing international borders with goods intended for personal consumption or sale to other Aboriginal people. In this case, both the majority and
the minority decisions found that the claimed right was not made out. This
finding was a matter of evidence for the majority. However, the minority
set of reasons, written by Binnie J., was founded on the claimed right not
34
35
36
37

Powley, above note 6.
Morris, above note 8.
R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray 2006 SCC 54 [Sappier].
Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – MNR) 2001 SCC 33, [2001] S.C.J. No. 33
[Mitchell].
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having survived the assertion of Crown sovereignty, because it was ousted
pursuant to the rules of sovereign succession.38 Justice Binnie found that
this conclusion was consistent with enabling reconciliation because:
[The claimed right] relates to national interests that all of us have in common rather than to distinctive interests that for some purposes differentiate an aboriginal community. In my view, reconciliation of these interests in
this particular case favours an affirmation of our collective sovereignty.39

This sense of reconciliation resonates with that of former Chief Justice
Lamer in Van der Peet, given its emphasis upon reconciliation through identifying and promoting what are assumed to be common interests. As noted
above, McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority in Mitchell, found that the
claimed right was not made out, and so did not engage in a justification analysis. However, McLachlin C.J. did respond briefly to Binnie J.’s deployment
of the doctrine of sovereign succession.
Although stating that she was refraining from commenting upon whether the doctrine of sovereign succession was relevant for defining Aboriginal
rights, she pointed out that the jurisprudence of the Court had already “affirmed the doctrines of extinguishment, infringement, and justification as
the appropriate framework for resolving conflicts between aboriginal rights
and competing claims, including claims based on Crown sovereignty.”40 This
statement could be taken to endorse the jurisprudence of her predecessor,
with which she had once so vigorously taken issue. Alternately it could be
read as merely stating a fact—that the jurisprudence exists and so there
is already a route for dealing with the sort of issues raised in the litigation,
without bringing in another doctrine.
Two years after Mitchell, in R. v. Powley, the Crown attempted to justify
legislation which infringed Metis Aboriginal rights on the basis of conservation 41 and administrative complexity.42 However, the conservation argument was based upon a rather scanty factual foundation and so merited
little discussion by the Court, except the observation that if conservation
was indeed an issue, that “the Metis would still be entitled to a priority

38
39
40
41
42

Ibid. at para. 172, Binnie J. for Major J.
Ibid. at para. 164, Binnie J. for Major J.
Ibid. at para. 63 [emphasis added], McLachlin CJ for Gonthier, Iacobucci, Arbour, and
LeBel JJ.
Powley, above note 6 at para. 48.
Ibid. at para. 49.
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allocation to satisfy their subsistence needs.”43 Although there is no suggestion here that the Court would moderate the right for the benefit of
the Canadian public, no argument on this point was actually made, so it
would be inappropriate to read much into this. The administrative burden
argument was, not surprisingly, dismissed as an inappropriate “basis for defeating . . . rights under the Constitution of Canada.”44 Having found in this
case that there was no lawful ground for denying Metis people the right to
hunt, the Court gestured briefly to the work which lay ahead: “In the longer
term, a combination of negotiation and judicial settlement will more clearly
define the contours of the Metis right to hunt.”45 We see here something of
an echo of McLachlin C.J.’s earlier writing—that the court will identify the
legal rights, but only negotiation will enable a full understanding of what
that right means in the contemporary setting.
In R. v. Morris,46 however, the question of whether public interests justify infringement in the name of reconciling Aboriginal rights with public
safety concerns was aggressively argued. This case concerned whether a
provincial prohibition on night hunting unlawfully infringed a treaty right
to hunt “as formerly,” given that the Aboriginal party’s ancestors who had
signed the treaty had engaged in night hunting. Unfortunately for the purposes of this paper, the majority judgment did not consider the arguments
on justified infringement because they found that the provincial law in
question was rendered jurisdictionally inoperative, pursuant to the division
of powers.47 The dissenting judgment, authored by McLachlin C.J. and Fish
J., also did not address the justification analysis. However, we do see the
resurgence of some of McLachlin J.’s (as she then was) reasoning in dissent
in Van der Peet.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Fish J. found against the Aboriginal claimants not on the basis that a legislated infringement was justified in the name
of reconciliation, but because they found that the constitutionally protected right did not extend to the practice at issue, which they had defined as
hunting in an unsafe manner.48 They based their decision on an interpretation of the right’s own internal limits, as defined by the understandings that
both the Aboriginal and European signatories would have brought to the
43
44
45
46
47
48

Ibid. at para. 48.
Ibid. at para. 49.
Ibid. at para. 50.
Morris, above note 8.
Ibid. at paras. 53–55, Deschamps and Abella JJ. for Binnie and Charron JJ.
Ibid. at paras. 110, 119, and 132, McLachlin C.J. and Fish J. for Bastarache J.
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treaty table. This approach, of focusing foremost on defining legal entitlement, is the same approach that McLachlin C.J. had said would clearly pass
constitutional muster in her dissent in Van der Peet. It is not insignificant for
the objective of reconciliation that this approach also implicitly supports a
robust role for indigenous self-regulation and laws in defining the scope of
Aboriginal and treaty rights.
The only other case in which a right was proven was R. v. Sappier; R. v.
Gray.49 As the Crown did not attempt to argue that its infringing legislation
was justified, the Court does not discuss its approach to infringement,50
although it does bring up the matter of reconciliation. In a situationally nuanced phrasing of the purpose of section 35(1), Bastarache J. wrote that that
section:
is to provide a constitutional framework for the protection of the distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples, so that their prior occupation of North
America can be recognized and reconciled with the sovereignty of the
Crown.51

Under this approach, the purpose of section 35(1) is still about reconciliation, but the manner in which it enables this purpose is framed in terms
of granting protection, not sanctioning erosion. Once again, given the brevity of the comment in Sappier, it is important not to speculate too much
about what was intended. However, further insight may arise through the
fact that the Court was effectively unanimous in this case in finding that
the proper interpretation of the Van der Peet test, for identifying Aboriginal
rights, had evolved to more closely resemble the approach that had been
advocated for by McLachlin J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. in in Van der Peet.52
This could suggest that more is indeed at play here.
The case also stands out for the robust manner in which the Court
defines the claimed right. The scope of the right—to harvest timber from
Crown lands for domestic purposes such as home building—will almost
definitely result in conflicts with existing Crown practices.53 Given the
49
50

51
52
53

Sappier, above note 36.
Ibid. at paras. 54–55, Bastarache J. for McLachlin C.J and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella,
Charron, and Rothstein JJ. Justice Binnie concurred except on one aspect of how the right
in question ought to be defined (at para. 74).
Ibid. at para. 22.
Ibid. at paras. 33–47.
Constance MacIntosh, “Developments in Aboriginal Law: The 2006–2007 Term” (2007) 38
S.C.L.R. (2d) 1 at 36–37 [MacIntosh, “2006–2007”].
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consequences of this definition for industry tree farm licence holders and
others, governments were effectively put on alert that they cannot let negotiations about the contemporary manifestations of Aboriginal legal entitlements languish.
There is little to be specifically gleaned from the rights cases discussed
above regarding how the current Court links governmental authority to
infringe upon Aboriginal rights to its vision of what is required to enable
reconciliation, although it has cast considerable doubts on provincial authority to infringe upon Aboriginal rights.54 We do, however, see considerable development of the concept of reconciliation in a series of other cases
that were released in 2004 and 2005. These cases follow a different line and
deploy the concept of reconciliation to signal a dynamic process.55

2) Placing Reconciliation as a Process at the Foreground
The theory of reconciliation to which the members of McLachlin’s Court
subscribe, and the role of the judiciary in enabling reconciliation, emerge
strongly in a pair of decisions made by McLachlin C.J.: Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v. British Columbia,56 and Haida Nation v. British Columbia.57
The theory also guides the analysis in the reasons of Binnie J. in Mikisew
Cree First Nation v Canada.58 There is thematic unity regarding the notion
of reconciliation in all three of these decisions. Notably, they are all unanimous decisions. Given this level of unity, it becomes appropriate to speak of
McLachlin’s Court as sharing a theory of reconciliation. As discussed below,
the evolved notion of reconciliation moderates the centrality of the justified
infringement analysis as the location for judicial oversight of whether the
Crown has acted in a manner consistent with the reconciliation process.
In Haida Nation, the Court was asked to decide whether Crown obligations arose in the context of claimed rights which had not been recognized
54

55
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See, for example, Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and Third Party Interests: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia” (2010) 8 Indigeous L.J. 7 [McNeil, “Third Party Interests”], Kent
McNeil, “The Metis and the Doctrine of Interjurisdictional Immunity: A Commentary” in
Frederica Wilson & Melanie Mallet, eds., Metis-Crown Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction and Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 289–322.
See Newman, “Reconciliation,” above note 11 at 85.
Taku River First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550,
2004 SCC 74 [Taku River].
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73
[Haida Nation].
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388,
2005 SCC 69.
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by the Canadian state or pursuant to a judicial process. (The Court gives
such claimed rights the rather problematic label “unproven rights.”59) The
specific question was whether, in such situations, the Crown was under
any unique obligation to acknowledge or address those claims through a
process of consultation and accommodation.60 The Court’s answer, in brief,
was that sometimes such procedural and potentially substantive obligations
had to arise, because, if they did not, reconciliation would not be possible.61
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice McLachlin observed that consultation
was likely a necessary precondition for reconciliation, because it could “preserve . . . the Aboriginal interest pending claims resolution and foster . . .
a relationship between the parties that makes possible negotiations, the
preferred process for achieving ultimate reconciliation.”62
This approach, to be adopted when claimed rights or “proven” rights63
may be at odds with actual or proposed state decisions or laws, has the effect of displacing the practical relevance of the justified infringement analysis. Whereas in the face of conflict, the Van der Peet (and Sparrow) approach
would ask whether a law is justified in infringing an Aboriginal right given
competing public interests, this approach asks whether the law-making or
decision-making process which makes infringement a possibility was lawful
given the claimed Aboriginal interests. The Court thus interprets section
35(1)’s reconciliation mandate as requiring the state to engage in negotiation about the terms under which a right can potentially be impaired in
the name of social, economic, or other interests before it can expect any
judicial endorsement that its ultimate assessment is constitutionally sound.
The significance of the state objective—as the litmus test for whether in59

60
61

62
63

See discussion in Constance MacIntosh, “On Obligations and Contamination: The CrownAboriginal Relationship in the Context of Internationally-sourced Infringements” (2009)
72:2 Sask. L. Rev. 187 [MacIntosh, “On Obligations”].
Haida Nation, above note 57 at para. 6, McLachlin C.J.
Ibid. at para. 33, McLachlin C.J. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote that unless obligations
arose prior to proof, then when “the distant goal of proof is finally reached, the Aboriginal
peoples may find their land and resources changed and denuded. This is not reconciliation. Nor is it honourable” (at para. 33).
Ibid. at para. 38, McLachlin C.J.
In Mikisew Cree, above note 7 at para. 59, Binnie J. observes that in the case of a proposed
“taking up” under a treaty, that “it is not correct . . . to move directly to a Sparrow analysis.” Rather, the consultation process must be assessed. The Court will undoubtedly offer
further clarification on this point when it hears the appeal in Little Salmon/Carmacks First
Nation v. Yukon (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources), 2008 YKCA 13, [2008] Y.J. No. 55,
leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2008] SCCA 448 (29 January 2009) [Little Salmon]. This
case considers the duty to consult in the context of a modern treaty.
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fringements are constitutional—consequently fades as the judicial focus
on constitutionality shifts to scrutinizing the consistency of the process
with what is necessary to foster respectful relations. Presumably, when the
process meets constitutional standards and is consistent with the honour of
the Crown, then the ultimate Crown decision about how to balance interests will likely pass muster.64 In this way, the Court robustly shifted the role
that the state and Aboriginal parties can expect it to play in overseeing the
reconciliation process.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s discussion of reconciliation in Haida Nation
and Taku River resonates somewhat with her reasons in dissent in Van der
Peet, where she stressed that Aboriginal people’s constitutionalized rights
could, in most instances, only be lawfully abrogated by consent—that is, by
treaty. In Haida Nation, she brings a consonant position forward, reminding
the parties that “[t]reaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty.”65 By implication, incident-specific
judicial decisions about whether or not certain statutes or regulations can
lawfully infringe upon a certain right are positioned as playing a marginal
role in the reconciliation process. Writing on recent jurisprudence, Mark
Walters made this point in a very simple fashion. He wrote: “By ‘reconciliation,’ the Court does not mean a technical process of fitting disparate parts
together—it is not like reconciling financial accounts.”66
Having negotiated and consensual agreements, as opposed to judicial
findings, at the foreground as the key routes to reconciliation, McLachlin
C.J. resurrected one of her objections to former Chief Justice Lamer’s approach to infringement in Van der Peet. As noted above, she had objected
to his approach to infringement because it permitted the Crown to unilaterally erode section 35(1) rights in the name of reconciling those rights with
public interests. In Haida, the Court unanimously endorsed the conclusion
that consultation pending resolution of a claim may be required because
“[t]o unilaterally exploit a claimed resource during the process of proving
and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that resource, may be to deprive the
Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource. That is not
honourable.”67 Returning to this practical reading in Mikisew Cree, Binnie J.
described consultation as “key to [the] achievement of the overall objective

64
65
66
67

See Mikisew Cree, above note 7.
Haida Nation, above note 57 at para. 20, McLachlin C.J.
Walters, “Constitutionalism,” above note 11 at para. 54.
Haida Nation, above note 57 at para. 27, McLachlin C.J.
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of the modern law of treaty and aboriginal rights, namely, reconciliation.”68
Reconciliation is centrally achieved not by determining how Aboriginal
rights may need to be infringed in the name of the public good, but by negotiating how to respect the various legal and social interests.
Although the McLachlin Court’s vision of reconciliation would, in some
instances, restrain the Crown from acting unilaterally in a way that affected
“unproven” Aboriginal rights, this vision does not suggest that the Crown
must yield to Aboriginal perspectives on the appropriate outcome of the
consultation process. Instead, the Court indicates at many points in Haida
Nation and Taku River that the ultimate decision about how to proceed in
situations of “unproven rights” rests with the Crown, and that the Crown is
required to balance societal and Aboriginal interests, which may result in
decisions that do not meet the approval of the Aboriginal parties.69
Arguably, McLachlin’s Court is exercising caution here, to carefully
carve out the territory of judicial versus political roles in enabling reconciliation. Once again, this resonates with then Justice McLachlin’s approach to
the court’s proper role in the reconciliation process as articulated in her dissent in Van der Peet. As discussed in Haida Nation, this approach preserves
a robust role for treaties, and ensures that the obligation to consult does
not result in Aboriginal parties experiencing as fulsome an outcome as they
potentially could through treaty negotiations. Such an outcome would be
undesirable to McLachlin’s Court, because it would be too close to enabling
a situation where courts—and not consensual political processes—impose
terms for reconciliation (which, of course, would not be a reconciliation at
all!).70 Nonetheless, the judicial push to define rights through treaties has
68
69

70

Mikisew Cree, above note 7 at para. 63, Binnie J. [emphasis added].
Haida Nation, above note 57 at paras. 45, 48, and 50, Taku River, above note 56 at para. 42.
This outcome has been critiqued, as has the pair of decisions, for setting up a complicated task with inadequate guidance. For a critique that the cases assert an assimilative
pressure upon Aboriginal peoples to accede to Canadian law’s categories (and thus deny
their own), see Gordon Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation” (2005) 23 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 17. For a general
discussion of advantages and “pitfalls” of this jurisprudence, see Timothy Huyer, “Honour
of the Crown: The New Approach to Crown-Aboriginal Reconciliation” (March 2006) 21
Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 33. For a discussion of how the cases were applied in the
first few years after they were rendered, see Gordon Christie “Developing Case Law: The
Future of Consultation and Accommodation” (2006) 39 U.B.C.L. Rev. 139 at paras. 66–129.
See McNeil, “Third Party Interests,” above note 54, where he observes that such decisions
have the effect of recognizing rights, but not reconciling them. On the importance of distinguishing between recognition and reconciliation, see Slattery, “Generative Structure,”
above note 11.
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been critiqued as a form of neocolonial consensual entailment—as the outcome of treaties seems to be Aboriginal people ceding some rights so as to
have other rights affirmed, instead of having all existing rights affirmed.71
The newly conceptualized reconciliation process may modestly assuage
this critique.
The McLachlin Court identifies the reconciliation process—which on
a practical level is only marginally about resolving specific clashes, and centrally about enabling processes for finding ways to agree to live together—as perpetual or ongoing. This aspect of the Court’s understanding of
“reconciliation” is raised as part of a general discussion in Haida, and then
explicitly applied in Mikisew Cree. In Haida, McLachlin C.J. wrote:
the duty to consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and
continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a final
legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather it is a process flowing from rights
guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.72

The Court could not have been clearer in signalling that political energies will need to go into reconciling the consequences of how “pre-existing
Aboriginal sovereignty” coexists with “assumed Crown sovereignty”73 for
as long as there are Aboriginal peoples and a Crown in Canada. Writing
on how the Court used “reconciliation” in its decisions in Haida Nation and
Taku River, Dwight Newman describes the jurisprudence as transforming
section 35(1) “from a static guarantee into a bulwark of a dynamic constitutional process” and “transform[ing] the conception of reconciliation from
a description of an end state into a concept that . . . shapes a creationary
constitutional process.”74 This approach is resonant with that advocated by
such political philosophers as James Tully, who writes:
[R]econciliation is neither a form of recognition handed down to Indigenous peoples from the state nor a final settlement of some kind. It is an
on-going partnership negotiated by free peoples based on principles they
can both endorse and open to modification en passant.”75

71
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See Tully, above note 11 at 278.
Haida Nation, above note 57 at para. 32.
This phrasing is drawn from ibid. at para. 20.
Newman, “Reconciliation,” above note 11 at 85.
Tully, above note 11 at 223. I thank John Borrows for introducing me to this volume.
b 218 c

PLMC 09 MacIntosh.indd 218

07/04/2011 3:48:01 PM

The Reconciliation Doctrine in the McLachlin Court

The interpretation of reconciliation which is articulated in Haida Nation, that it is a process with certain tangible markers along the way (like
treaties), is aggressively put into play in the reasons for judgment in Mikisew
Cree. Here the litigation concerned a treaty term which precluded the exercise of certain rights on tracts of land “as may be required or taken up”
by the Crown for various purposes.76 The Crown decided to take up land
for what the Court observed was likely an appropriate purpose given the
terms of the treaty.77 This was to build a winter road that would cross over
treaty land and join various communities. One group of treaty beneficiaries
objected on the ground that they held rights to be consulted and accommodated, due to likely impacts upon their rights to hunt and trap under the
treaty, and that the consultation about these impacts had been inadequate.
Among other arguments, the minister took the position that consultation
and accommodation had already taken place, prior to the treaty being
signed in 1899, and were reflected in the terms of the treaty itself.78 In short,
the Crown argued that it had already fulfilled its obligations to honourably
effect a reconciliation, and that it could act upon its treaty right to take up
land without further consultation. The Court disagreed.
In response to the Crown’s argument, Binnie J. wrote:
[The Crown’s position] is not correct . . . Treaty making is an important
stage in the long process of reconciliation, but it is only a stage. What occurred at Fort Chilewyan in 1899 was not the complete discharge of the
duty arising from the honour of the Crown, but a rededication of it.
In summary, the 1899 negotiations were the first step in a long journey that is unlikely to end any time soon.79

This decision represents a fine-tuning and clarification of the relationship between reconciliation and treaty-making, which will undoubtedly
be further developed when the Court rules on consultation requirements
in the context of a modern treaty in Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation.80
However, what can fairly be observed thus far is that in the early jurisprudence, as described above, the process of negotiating treaties was described
as “the stage of reconciliation.”81 Here the process of negotiating a treaty is
76
77
78
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80
81

Mikisew Cree, above note 7 at para. 3, Binnie J.
Ibid. at para. 60, Binnie J.
Ibid. at para. 53, Binnie J.
Ibid. at paras. 54–55, Binnie J.
Little Salmon, above note 63.
Van der Peet, above note 3 at para. 313, McLachlin J. in dissent.
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no longer recognized as “the stage.” Instead, it is an “important stage . . . but
it is only a stage.” The consequences of this evolved understanding of the
relationship between treaties and reconciliation are considerable. This shift
illustrates a close attentiveness on the part of the Court to what their prior
formulations did or did not effectively signal or clearly enable.
The ability to add nuance, responsiveness, and incremental change—in
novel situations, or based upon the experience of how reasons have been
applied and interpreted (and their practical outcomes)—is key for enabling
the common law system to produce just outcomes. Such revisiting and revisionism is highly desirable in this area of law, “given the complexity and
sensitivity of the task”82 required by section 35(1).
In his recent writings about specific aspects of the Van der Peet test,
and how the Court “has quietly initiated the process of reshaping the test’s
basic tenets,”83 Brian Slattery makes the following observation:
This evolution in the jurisprudence should come as no surprise. It is a
distinctive feature of common law systems to shun absolute principles
conceived a priori in favour of flexible principles fleshed out in concrete
cases. The Van der Peet decision was handed down at a time when there
was a dearth of judicial authority on the Aboriginal rights recognized in
section 35(1) . . . . While the test served its purpose at the time, inevitably
it has needed revision and amendment.84

So, just over a year after the reasons in Haida Nation and Taku River
were released, with their emphasis upon reconciliation as an ongoing process, we have a concrete example in Mikisew Cree of what the Court meant
when it wrote that reconciliation is a process that continues “beyond formal
claims resolution.” A treaty is not a final accommodation of Aboriginal and
Crown interests, but rather a rededication that the Crown will continue to
reconcile conflicting interests when its activities or interests may impinge
upon those of Aboriginal peoples (moderated, of course, by the actual terms
of the treaty). The promise of “reconciliation” of section 35(1) is a promise to
engage in processes of attempting to come to consensual agreements about
how to live together, where those agreements are not final but rather a template for managing good relations, which is to be revisited as circumstances
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Slattery, “Generative Structure,” above note 11 at 628.
Ibid. at 598.
Ibid. at 628.
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change. However, jurisprudential findings do not always support the formation of such positive processes or relationships of respect.

D. Unreconciled tensions
Several of the decisions rendered by McLachlin’s Court have, in various
ways, referred to the need to enable a “just and lasting settlement,” a phrase
which, following Mikisew Cree, could fairly be recast as a “just and lasting
process.” Decisions such as Haida Nation, Taku River, and Mikisew Cree clearly indicate that the Court contemplates the formation of relationships of
mutual respect, as well as processes for maintaining and refreshing those
relationships, as pivotal to realizing this goal.85 The jurisprudence discussed
above supports this goal in several ways. One core means is by requiring the
Crown and Aboriginal peoples to engage in political dialogue through the
consultation and accommodation process. As a result, neither party should
take the other party by surprise, and neither party should experience a
sense of its interests being denigrated or ignored. This is a very challenging
objective that the Court has set out to achieve, given the history of relationships and power differentials between the parties.
The challenge is made all the harder by the fact that not every matter
that impacts upon the Crown-Aboriginal relationship in a significant way
is embraced by the scope of section 35(1). The filter for identifying what
falls under section 35(1)—and so the content which Aboriginal people are
deemed to a priori have the legal right to carry into negotiations, or be
consulted about—is fairly narrow. For example, rights to the land (for example, what falls from Aboriginal title) only attract section 35(1)’s reconciliation imperative if Aboriginal claimants can show, or have a chance of
showing pursuant to the Haida spectrum,86 exclusive occupation at the time
of Crown sovereignty.87 For other Aboriginal rights to be embraced within
the reconciliation framework, the rights must be shown to be (or shown to
be likely to be) “integral to the distinctive culture” of the Aboriginal people
in question.88
This creates tension, as many matters of vital importance to fostering
Aboriginal-Crown relations and remedying past and ongoing injustices, fall
85
86
87
88

Reconciliation and practices of mutual respect are explicitly tied together by Binnie J. in
Mikisew Cree, above note 7 at para. 49.
Haida Nation, above note 57 at paras. 35–38.
Delgamuukw, above note 4 at para. 143.
Van der Peet, above note 3.
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outside of this framework. This is not to suggest that the courts should be
everywhere—their role is restrained to when they are asked to adjudicate,
and even then the courts may determine that their powers do not extend
to resolving the matter at issue. Reconciliation is ultimately a political relationship, and turns on governmental, not judicial action.89 However, when
these instances arise in the courtroom, and the court finds it has jurisdiction to adjudicate, the rule of law may in practice undermine the relationships of historically responsive mutual respect which logically must be
co-constituted with relationships of reconciliation.
This tension is illustrated in two recent decisions of the McLachlin Court,
Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada90 and McDiarmid Lumber Ltd.
v God’s Lake First Nation.91 Both cases turned, in part, on the interpretation
of the Indian Act. This statute controls many facets of Aboriginal peoples’
lives, and dictates aspects of their relationship with the federal government,
both in its executive and legislative capacities.92 However, its terms have
largely been imposed unilaterally by the federal government. This creates
considerable practical problems for relationship-building. These cases, and
what they represent for enabling reconciliation, are described below. In
the following section, the paper will address how the Court has identified
sources of authority for the judiciary to legitimately extend reconciliation
practices, without overstepping the judicial/political divide, to try to ensure
that we are not left with an untenable situation.
In God’s Lake First Nation, an Aboriginal community had entered into
an agreement (known as a CFA) with the federal government to transfer
the responsibility for administering and delivering some specific social services and community health programming. CFAs are a common element
of the current federal initiative to enable self-government through devolution protocols. Under CFAs, the federal government continues to finance,
to some degree, the devolved programming.93 God’s Lake First Nation also
89
90
91
92
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I am particularly grateful to Michael Asch for conversations on the distinctions between
the governmental and judicial role in reconciliation.
Ermineskin, above note 9.
McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. God’s Lake First Nation 2006 SCC 58, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 846.
For a careful discussion of the distinctions between the executive and legislative
branches of the government, and how these branches are pulled into relationships
with Aboriginal peoples in different ways, see Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice: Essays on
Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2001) at 316–22
[McNeil, “Emerging Justice”].
For specific details on funding programming which has been devolved under a health
transfer initiative, see Constance MacIntosh, “Envisioning the Future of Aboriginal
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had a large debt to a construction supply company. This company brought
an action to seize most of the funds that Canada had provided to the First
Nation for it to administer its programming.
The Crown and the First Nation together argued that the CFA funding
was shielded from garnishment pursuant to section 90(1)(b) of the Indian
Act which embraces “personal property” that is “given” to “a band under a
treaty or an agreement between a band and Her Majesty.”94 Based upon her
reading of section 90(1)(b), and the 1990 precedent of Mitchell v. Peguis Indian
Band,95 the chief justice found the CFA funding was not shielded. Rather,
writing for a 6:3 majority, she concluded that when these statutory provisions were drafted in 1951, Parliament had only intended to shield treaty
property, and property rendered under an agreement which was ancillary
to a treaty.96 Justice Binnie, writing the dissenting judgment, would have
interpreted section 90(1)(b)’s reference to “agreement” to embrace the property provided under any Crown-Aboriginal agreement which “reflects the
responsibilities assumed by the Crown” under section 91(24).97 That is, he
interpreted the statute with close attention to the role it plays, and responsibilities it recognizes, in the Crown-Aboriginal relationship.
The chief justice’s interpretation was based on Parliamentary intention
at the time the statutory terms were enacted in 1951 to promote “greater selfgovernment and participation in economic enterprise,”98 and a close reading
of statutory language as guided by the ejusdem generis rule. The dissenting
interpretation was driven by a concern with what Binnie J. described as “the
realities of life on most reserves.”99 In particular, Binnie J. argued that any
band facing debts “would be better off letting the government provide services directly to the reserve rather than attempting to provide the public
services themselves through . . . funding” to prevent the funds from being
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Health under the Health Transfer Process” (2008) Health L.J. 67. For details on funding
capital projects, such as water treatment facilities, see Constance MacIntosh, “Testing the
Waters: Jurisdictional and Policy Aspects of the Continuing Failure to Remedy Drinking
Water Quality on First Nation Reserves” (2008) 39 Ottawa L.R. 63.
Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5, s. 90(1)(b).
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 85.
God’s Lake, above note 91 at paras. 26, 28, and 46–68, McLachlin C.J. for Bastarache,
LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, and Rothstein JJ.
Ibid. at para. 87, Binnie J. for Fish and Abella JJ.
Ibid. at para. 51, McLachlin C.J.C. for Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, and Rothstein JJ.
Ibid. at para. 82, Binnie J. for Fish and Abella JJ.
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intercepted by creditors.100 And so, Binnie J. argued that in practical terms
the chief justice’s interpretation may ironically result in only the bands that
are already prosperous and solvent being able to participate. This division
arguably continues the divergence in approaches between these two justices that was evidenced in their contrary sets of reasons in 1998 in Union
of New Brunswick Indians v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance).101 The split
in that case could similarly be characterized as focusing on the question of
whether courts must interpret statutory terms according to original Parliamentary intent, or if courts are to interpret terms in accordance with what
is practically required to currently enable the background Parliamentary
purpose.
This case is not discussed here to suggest that the matters under consideration ought to have fallen under section 35(1), or to offer an analysis
about whether the case was properly decided.102 Rather, it is raised because
it may impact upon possibilities for reconciliation. This decision rendered
funding arrangements highly vulnerable across the country, and resulted in
the federal government paying off the private debt of God’s Lake First Nation and then likely having to provide the CFA funding a second time.
According to the majority, core principles of statutory interpretation—
adhering to the rule of law—demands this outcome. However, this outcome
effectively erodes the work that the federal government and First Nations
had done themselves towards figuring out how to reconcile Aboriginal interests in self-governing given their various economic situations. The Court
can tell the government and Aboriginal parties the effect of the law, but it
(rightfully) does not have the power to enact the legislation to enable redress
or to overcome adverse consequences to Crown-Aboriginal relationships.
The Ermineskin case is far more problematic in terms of eroding the relationships which required between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown if
the reconciliation process is to be supported.103 This decision, released in
the spring of 2009, largely turned on the interpretation of the interplay
of several statutes, both with themselves and with the common law. One
question the Court had to address was what responsibilities the Crown had
100 Ibid. at para. 94, Binnie J. for Fish and Abella JJ.
101 Union of New Brunswick Indians v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1161,
[1998] S.C.J. No 50.
102 For an analysis of this case, see MacIntosh, “2006–2007,” above note 53 at 5–18.
103 For a more fulsome discussion of Ermineskin, above note 9, see Constance MacIntosh,
“Developments in Aboriginal Law: The 2008–2009 Term” (2009) 48 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 1
[MacIntosh, “2008–2009”].
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when accruing and holding royalties on behalf of First Nations following the
surrender of treaty-based reserve lands for oil and gas production. Among
other points, the First Nations argued that the Crown had a fiduciary duty
to invest the royalties on their behalf. The Crown maintained that although
it may be a fiduciary, its duties were restricted by legislation to protecting
the funds from erosion and paying a reasonable rate of interest.104 The Court
concluded that federal legislation (the Financial Administrative Act and the Indian Act) required the Crown to borrow against the royalties and invest them
for its own benefit,105 while the Indian Act made it unlawful for the Crown to
invest the funds for the First Nation’s benefit.106 The Court thus determined
that the federal legislation in question exonerated the Crown, finding:
A fiduciary that acts in accordance with legislation cannot be said to be
breaching its fiduciary duty. The situation which the bands characterize
as a conflict of interest is an inherent and inevitable consequences of the
statutory scheme.107

Although clearly not its intention, the outcome of this decision effectively undermines the development of conciliatory relationships through
its finding that Parliament can legitimately and unilaterally set terms for
Crown responsibilities to First Nations which are far below that of a fiduciary or trustee at common law, and that Parliament can create what would
otherwise be an explicit conflict of interest between the Crown and First
Nations as long as it passes laws that sanction that conflict.108 There is a
striking contrast here between the nature of the relationship which Aboriginal people can expect to have with the Crown and the Crown in Parliament
when section 35(1) is clearly at play, and the relationship when it is not. The
legal justification for such a distinction can be easily laid out, but that is not
the point. The point, rather, is that the separation between the executive
and legislative branches of government may not be perceived as a legitimate by Aboriginal peoples who seek to be involved in a relationship with the
government. One cannot realistically expect Aboriginal peoples to trust in
a relationship when the other party is only expected to show respect or
104
105
106
107
108

Ermineskin ibid.
Ibid. at para. 127.
Ibid. at para. 122.
Ibid. at para. 128.
I thank Kent McNeil for his insights on thinking through the consequences for these
matters of the government being divided into an executive and legislative branch. All erroneous comments remain, of course, my own.
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recognize that a relationship is at play when acting with one hat on, and
not the other.
Most painfully in terms of the broader reconciliation agenda, although
the Indian Act authorizes the expenditure of funds held on behalf of a band
“for the benefit of the band,” there is no suggestion in this decision that the
meaning of that legislated phrase would best be determined in consultation
with a band. Certainly such consultation was not the norm in 1951 when it
was assumed that the Crown best knew how to take care of its ward. But
the ward relationship has long since been officially discarded.
In the opening passage of Mikisew Cree First Nation, Binnie J. wrote
the following about the relationship between reconciliation and the general
context in which reconciliation must take place:
The fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty
rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal
peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions. The management of these relationships takes place in the shadow of a long history
of grievances and misunderstanding. The multitude of smaller grievances
created by the indifference of some government officials to aboriginal
people’s concerns, and the lack of respect inherent in that indifference
has been as destructive of the process of reconciliation as some of the
larger and more explosive controversies.109

The decisions in God’s Lake First Nation and in Ermineskin about the
consequences of legislation for defining the terms of relationships and responsibilities—between the Crown and First Nations, between the Crown
and First Nations and private parties—will likely increase the size of the
shadow which Binnie J. was referring to. Such decisions and relationships
are part of the context which fuels grievances and which—to borrow Binnie J.’s phrasing—may be as destructive of the process of reconciliation
as the denial of the obligations clearly arising out of section 35(1). Justice
Binnie further observed that “unilateral Crown action . . . is the antithesis of reconciliation and mutual respect.”110 Although softened by rules of
interpretation,111 the Indian Act, as the product of unilateral Parliamentary
action, is presumably open to the same critique. Justice Binnie’s comment,
109 Mikisew Cree, above note 7 at para. 1, Binnie J.
110 Ibid. at para. 49, Binnie J. [emphasis added].
111 The Indian Act’s terms are to be “liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in
favour of the Indians”: Nowegijick v. The Queen, [9183] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36, affirmed in Mitchell,
above note 37 at 142–43, La Forest J. and 107–8, per Dickson C.J.
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once again, conceptually resonates with one of the core principles that animated McLachlin C.J.’s rejection of former Chief Justice Lamer’s approach
in her dissenting reasons in Van der Peet.112 Although Binnie J. was writing in
the context of a treaty claim, and then Justice McLachlin was writing about
a claimed section 35(1) Aboriginal right, the conclusion about the impact of
unilateral Crown action for the Crown-Aboriginal relationship—as a matter
of fact—holds true in other contexts as well.
What is the judiciary’s role in this? It cannot—and must not—do violence to statutory law or otherwise appropriate legislative jurisdiction by
reading statutes to say something which they do not. Writing about the
limited role of courts in enabling reconciliation, Justice Vickers observed:
In an ideal world, the process of reconciliation would take place outside the
adversarial milieu of a courtroom. This case demonstrates how the Court,
confined by the issues raised in the pleadings and the jurisprudence on
Aboriginal rights and title, is ill equipped to effect a reconciliation of competing interests. That must be reserved for a treaty negotiation process.
Despite this fact, the question remains: how can this Court participate
in the process of reconciliation between Tsilhqot’in people, Canada and
British Columbia in these proceedings?113

McLachlin’s Court has signalled awareness of this complex situation and of
the broader context in which the judiciary is being asked to make its decisions.
The next section shows how McLachlin’s Court has drawn upon reconciliation practices as practices that support relationship building in cases
where section 35(1) was not at play. Her Court has signalled that the reconciliation mandate is not contained by section 35(1), but exists more broadly.
As a result, in some instances, the Court has identified room for legitimately allowing the judiciary to provide some relief to the tensions described
above without transgressing the judicial/political divide.

112
113

Van der Peet, above note 3 at para. 310, McLachlin J. (in dissent).
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 CNLR 112 at para. 5
[Tsilhqot’in Nation]. For a careful analysis of how Vickers J. defines judicial versus political
roles and how they play out in addressing complex interests, see McNeil, “Third Party
Interests,” above note 54.
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E. Reconciliation practices outside of section 35(1)
situations
This section will illustrate that the Court has left somewhat open-ended
the question of whether and how the goal of reconciliation is legally relevant in situations which do not directly engage section 35(1). In the two
cases discussed above, the fact that there is a relationship which needs to
be advanced is simply not raised (except in Binnie J.’s dissenting reasons in
God’s Lake), and the outcome is arguably potentially destructive of the reconciliation process. However, in a few decisions, the Court’s reasons have
indicated that reconciliation is a more general requirement, and is not contained by situations where section 35(1) rights are squarely at issue. A level
of open-endedness is evident here because we do not yet know the extent
of such situations.
A hint of this position arises in Mitchell, where in her set of reasons the
chief justice observed that out of the Crown assertion that “sovereignty
over the land, and ownership of its underlying title[] vested in the Crown . . .
[there] arose an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably
. . .”114 Although the context was the assessment of a section 35(1) claim, this
statement does not suggest that the obligation to act honourably only arises
when rights claims are at issue. Rather, it comes out of the fact that the
Crown asserted it was sovereign. The chief justice is more explicit in Haida
Nation. Here she invoked a principle that has been articulated in a number
of decisions, going back to at least 1996.115 She wrote that “the honour of the
Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.”116 She then
describes how acting with honour is a precondition for reconciliation:
The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest
that it must be understood generously in order to reflect the underlying
realities from which it stems. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples,
from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably. Nothing less is
required if we are to achieve “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”117

114
115

Mitchell, above note 37 at para. 9.
Chief Justice McLachlin specifically cites R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at para. 41 and R.
v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456.
116 Haida Nation, above note 57 at para. 16.
117 Ibid. at para. 17.
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Once again, although these comments are made in a case about a claim
based on section 35(1), it is clear that this requirement to act with honour
so as to enable reconciled and respectful relationships does not arise exclusively as a result of section 35(1) being enacted, nor is it contained by matters recognized by section 35(1). This is expressly indicated by the example
McLachlin C.J. draws upon to elucidate her point. Making reference to a
non-section 35(1) case in her next paragraph, McLachlin C.J. writes:
The honour of the Crown gives rise to different duties in different circumstances. Where the Crown has assumed discretionary control over
specific Aboriginal interests, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty: Weywaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 . . .118

Thus the requirement to act with honour clearly extends reconciliation
practices beyond the ambit of section 35(1) cases. Sometimes these actions
will take the form of duties which, although having nothing to do with defining or accommodating Aboriginal or treaty rights, are nonetheless part
of ensuring that reconciliation does not become “a distant legalistic goal.”119
What we do not know is the scope of “different circumstances” in which
“duties” will arise, nor what those “different duties” may look like.
Reflecting back upon the complex litigation and multiple issues that
were brought up in Ermineskin, one is left wondering what this Court would
have decided if it was squarely asked to contemplate the relationship between the obligations of honour and the legislation that drove the result. In
particular, was Parliament’s unilateral exercise of control over the interests
of Aboriginal people sufficient to invoke fiduciary responsibilities regarding
permissible terms.120 Alternately, was the unilateral exercise of legislative
power sufficient to raise concerns about Parliamentary enactments eroding the possibility of the Crown being able, on a practical level, to act with
honour. The Court may be pressed to speak to such questions in the future,
about what normative doctrines may restrain or guide Parliamentary authority when acting pursuant to the powers recognized by section 91(24). It
would not be inconsistent with existing jurisprudence to find that the constitutional imperative to strive toward reconciliation practices permeates
and guides most aspects of Crown-Aboriginal relationships, and so intro118 Ibid. at para. 18.
119 Ibid. at para. 33.
120 For example, under the terms of Wewaykum, above note 7. For an analysis of when Parliament became subject to fiduciary obligations, see McNeil, ”Emerging Justice,” above note
92 at 316–22.
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duces, at the least, elements of restraint into how this power is legitimately
exercised whenever it is exercised.
There is one clear example of what it could mean to broadly infuse
the reconciliation mandate into Crown-Aboriginal relations in the minority
decision in R. v. Kapp,121 written by Bastarache J. His reasons radiate with
concern about how the judiciary can support the broader reconciliation
project, and particularly reflect the fact that, at the end of the day, reconciliation depends upon a negotiated political relationship that is supported
by Canadian and Aboriginal governments. Although concurring with the
majority that the federal government could issue commercial fishing permits to First Nation organizations to engage in exclusive fishing openings
without offending the Charter rights of non-Aboriginal fishers, Bastarache
J.’s path of reasoning was novel.122 He resolved the claim by mobilizing section 25 of the Charter. His reasons were not endorsed by the majority, which
signalled that it may have interpreted section 25 quite differently,123 and so
we see a potential split of the Court on the reconciliation mandate.
Nonetheless, Bastarache J.’s decision provides the first fulsome treatment of section 25 by a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada—and so
will be an important touchstone for subsequent decisions.124 This provision
states that Charter rights guarantees “shall not be construed to abrogate or
derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights and freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal people of Canada,” including those recognized by the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 and those that exist or may be acquired by way
of land claims agreements. Justice Bastarache concluded that this provision
“protects federal, provincial and aboriginal initiatives that seek to further
interests associated with indigenous difference from Charter scrutiny.”125
These sorts of initiatives include “[l]egislation that distinguishes between
aboriginal and non-aboriginal people in order to protect interests associated with aboriginal culture, territory, sovereignty, or the treaty process,”126
that is, legislation which would most likely be enacted pursuant to the authority of section 91(24).
Justice Bastarache’s conclusion bears repeating. He found the constitutional intention was that legislation that protected Aboriginal interests (not
121
122
123
124
125
126

Kapp, above note 9.
Ibid. at paras. 76–77, Bastarache J.
Ibid. at paras. 62–65, McLachlin C.J. and Abella J.
For commentary on Kapp, see MacIntosh, “2008-2009,” above note 103.
Kapp, above note 9 at para. 103, Bastarache J.
Ibid. at para. 103, Bastarache J.
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just matters which fit through section 35(1)’s filter) was shielded from Charter scrutiny. There is an intriguing resonance here with Binnie J.’s dissent
in God’s Lake, where he would have found that all agreements that reflected
section 91(24) responsibilities would have been shielded from garnishment
and taxation.127
Justice Bastarache’s interpretation of section 25 came from his reading
of the Court’s unanimous reconciliation jurisprudence: Haida Nation and
Taku River. It also follows from Bastarache J.’s reasons in Sappier, writing for
the Court on this point, that section 35(1) requires Aboriginal cultures to be
protected if reconciliation is to be achieved. Justice Bastarache also found
support for this outcome in the admonitions in Delgamuukw and Sparrow
that the Crown must negotiate in good faith.128 His reasoning is persuasive
on a variety of levels. On a practical level, Haida Nation and Taku River require the Crown to accommodate Aboriginal claims prior to rights being
proven. Logically, if such accommodation agreements are subject to private
challenges on Charter grounds, then the Aboriginal party would be forced to
formally prove its right for the accommodation to remain in place, and the
reconciliation that the negotiated accommodation represents would likely
be undermined.
Importantly, Bastarache J.’s approach would shield not just agreements
that address matters that could be proven to be Aboriginal rights under
section 35(1), but would embrace other, broader issues which need to be
addressed in agreements which are not just preliminary to a treaty, but
are part of forming a treaty relationship. In Bastarache J.’s words, “[section]
25 reflects this imperative need to accommodate and reconcile aboriginal
interests.”129 In finding that section 25 operates not unlike a “notwithstanding clause,” Bastarache J. is arguing for judicial deference to negotiated political decisions in this complex arena of working through political, legal,
social, and economic interests.
It is in Bastarache J.’s third last paragraph that he most explicitly ties all
the threads together. He writes that “Section 25 is a necessary partner to
s. 35(1); it protects s. 35(1)[’s] purposes and enlarges the reach of measures
needed to fulfill the promise of reconciliation.”130
It is this final argument, with its call to practical necessity, which may
prove to be the most persuasive to his colleagues on McLachlin C.J.’s bench,
127
128
129
130

God’s Lake, above note 91 at para. 87, Binnie J. for Fish and Abella JJ. (in dissent).
Ibid. at para. 106, Bastarache J.
Ibid. at para. 106, Bastarache J.
Ibid. at para. 121, Bastarache J.
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and so may enable his position to come to be endorsed by McLachlin’s Court.
The Court has demanded that parties adopt a practical and meaningful approach to section 35(1)’s manifestations. It has taken the position that if
one fails to contemplate practical outcomes, then reconciliation will only
arise in theory, not in lived relationships, and that this outcome is not an
acceptable one.131 This approach was perhaps most strongly articulated in
Sappier,132 but was also present in Marshall133 and Haida,134 as well as in Lamer
C.J.’s Court in Delgamuukw.135 Justice Bastarache’s observations in Kapp are
immensely practical ones, given the complexities involved in enabling a
consensual and treaty-based relationship between Aboriginal peoples and
the Crown. In reasons that are not unlike those of then Justice McLachlin
in Van der Peet in terms of their passion, clarity, and emphasis upon legal
principle, Bastarache J. has pointed to another key route for the judiciary to
enable and support the process of reconciliation and the political development of relationships of mutual respect.

F. Conclusion
The current Court, under the guidance of McLachlin C.J., has drawn upon
the purpose of section 35(1)—reconciliation—to transform many aspects of
Crown-Aboriginal relations, bringing in changes and challenges which have
brought the parties into conversation in a manner which has likely not been
experienced for centuries in some parts of the county. Reviving McLachin
C.J.’s basic premises in Van der Peet, her Court has uniformly endorsed the
position that the reconciliation process largely takes place outside of the
courtroom, and that judicial decisions cannot be expected to create the
terms of reconciliation for the parties, although courts will marshal this
creationary constitutional process to some degree when asked to do so.136
Although the purpose of 35(1) “is to facilitate the ultimate reconciliation
of prior Aboriginal occupation with de facto Crown sovereignty,”137 given
131

132
133
134
135
136
137

For a discussion of the Court’s emphasis upon interpreting rights to be meaningful in
their contemporary form, and to approaching the adjudication process with an eye to
practicalities, see MacIntosh, “On Obligations,” above note 59.
Sappier, above note 36 at para. 49.
Marshall (No. 2), above note 5 at para. 52.
Haida Nation, above note 57 at paras. 31 and 63.
Delgamuukw, above note 4 at paras. 90–108.
These conclusions are clearly present in the recent decision of Vickers J. in Tsilhqot’in Nation, above note 113. See, in particular, paras. 1357–368.
Taku River, above note 56 at para. 42, McLachlin C.J.
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the broader context in which Crown-Aboriginal relations take place, this
purpose likely needs bolstering from outside the spectrum of section 35(1)
rights considerations if it is to be realistically attainable. The Court has signalled a certain level of sensitivity to this matter, and it has—unanimously—identified somewhat open-ended conceptual points that potentially
grant the judiciary considerable room to bring in the norm of reconciliation, while simultaneously taking care not to overstep the political/judicial
divide. Undoubtedly, the Court will continue to develop its reconciliation
jurisprudence in response to changing situations, experiences, and practical imperatives.
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